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The main aim of this paper is contributing to what in the last
few years has been known as computational creativity. This
will be done by showing the relevance of a particular math-
ematical representation of Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual spaces to
the problem of modelling a phenomenon which plays a cen-
tral role in producing novel and fruitful representations of per-
ceptual patterns: analogy.
Introduction
There is an old tradition going back to Plato for which the
phenomena which fall under the concept of creativity are
those associated with the acquisition and mastery of some
kind of craft (techne), rather than with random activity and
aimless chance. According to this way of thinking, there is
no reason to believe that an unschooled little ant that hap-
pens to draw in its course on the sand the first page of the
score of the St. Matthew’s Passion is engaged in a creative
activity.
Indeed, for the supporters of this tradition, including the
later Wittgenstein, creativity presupposes the existence of a
high level linguistic competence typical of human beings.
Here, of course, painting and music making — when seen as
profoundly different from doodling or from casual humming
—- are considered to be activities involving the use of some
kind of articulated visual or auditory vehicles which give
expression to feelings, emotions, etc., articulated visual or
auditory vehicles which come with a syntax.
If we were successful in our attempt to model anal-
ogy within the particular mathematical representation of
Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual spaces we have chosen, this, be-
sides scoring a point in favour of the computational cre-
ativity research programme (Cardoso, Veale, and Wiggins
2009), (Colton and Wiggins 2012), would also have impor-
tant consequences with regard to the tenability of the old tra-
ditional view of creativity we mentioned above. For, since
Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual spaces, as we shall see in what fol-
lows, are placed in the sub-linguistic level of the cognitive
architecture of a cognitive agent (CA), there would be at
least a phenomenon intuitively belonging to creativity which
could be represented independently of language.
After a section dedicated to a brief survey of some of the
central contributions to the study of the connection between
analogical thinking and computation, the paper proceeds to
an explanation of how analogy is related to creativity. The
article then develops by means of an illustration of the cogni-
tive architecture of our CA in which the nature and function
of Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual spaces is made explicit.
A characterization of two conceptual spaces present in the
‘library’ of our CA — the visual and the music conceptual
spaces — is then offered and visual analogues of music pat-
terns are examined. The theoretical points made in the paper
are, eventually, illustrated in the discussion of a case study.
Analogical thinking and computation
Human cognition is deeply involved with analogy-making
processes. Analogical capabilities make possible perceiving
clouds as resembling to animals, solving problems through
the identification of similarities with previously solved prob-
lems, understanding metaphors, communicating emotions,
learning, etc. (Kokinov and French 2006), (Holyoak et al.
2001).
Analogical reasoning is ordinarily used to ‘transfer’ struc-
tures, relational properties, etc. from a source domain to a
target domain, and is clearly involved in that human ability
which consists in producing generalizations.
Many models for analogical thinking are present in the
literature. They are characterized by: (1) the ways of repre-
senting the knowledge on which the analogical capability is
based, (2) the processes involved in realizing the analogical
relation, and by (3) the manner in which the analogical trans-
fer is fulfilled (Krumnack, Khnberger, and Besold 2013).
A known class of computational models for analogy-
making are those based on Gentner’s (1983) Structure Map-
ping Theory (SMT). This theory was the first that focussed
on the role of the structural similarity existing between
source and target domains, structural similarity which is
generated by common systems of relations obtaining be-
tween objects in the respective domains. The structure map-
ping theory uses graphs to represent the domains and com-
putes analogical relations by identifying maximal matching
sub-graphs (Krumnack, Khnberger, and Besold 2013).
Other models are based on a connectionist approach, for
example, we can mention here the Structured Tensor Ana-
logical Reasoning (STAR) (Halford et al. 1994) and its ‘evo-
lution’ STAR-2 (Wilson et al. 2001), which provide mech-
anisms for computing analogies using representations based
on the mathematics of tensor products (Holyoak et al. 2001);
and the framework for Learning and Inference with Schemas
and Analogies (LISA) (Hummel and Holyoak 1996) which
exploits temporally synchronized activations in a neural net-
work to identify a mapping between source and target ele-
ments.
In 1989 Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (Holyoak and
Thagard 1989) proposed a theory of analogical mapping
based upon interacting structural, semantic, and pragmatic
constraints that have to be satisfied at the same time, im-
plementing the theory as an emergent process of activation
states of neuron-like objects.
According to (French 1995), metaphorical language, anal-
ogy making and couterfactualization are all products of the
mind’s ability to perform slippage (i.e. the replacement of
one concept in the description of some situation by another
related one) fluidly. All analogies involve some degree of
conceptual slippage: under some pressure, concepts slip into
related concepts. On the notion of conceptual slippage is
based Copycat, a model of analogy making developed in
1988 by Douglas Hofstadter et al. (Hofstadter and Mitchell
1994).
In (Kazjon Grace and Saunders 2012), a computational
model of associations, based on an interpretation-driven
framework, was put forward and applied to the domain of
real-world ornamental designs, where an association is un-
derstood in terms of the process of constructing new rela-
tionships between different ideas, objects or situations.
In (Grace, Saunders, and Gero 2008) a computational
model for the creation of original associations has been pre-
sented. The approach is based on the concept of interpreta-
tion, which is defined as “a perspective on the meaning of
an object; a particular way of looking at an object” 1 , and
acts on conceptual spaces, where concepts are defined as re-
gions in that space. In this context the authors represent the
interpretation process as a transformation applied to the con-
ceptual space from which feature-based representations are
generated. The model tries to identify relationships that can
be built between a source object and a target object. A new
association is constructed when the transformations applied
to these objects contribute to the emergence of some shared
features which were not present before the application of the
transformations.
Creativity and Analogy
It is intuitively correct to say that the use of a stick made
by a bird to catch a larva in the bark of a tree is creative, as
it is creative the writing of a poem or the introduction of a
new mathematical concept. Creativity, indeed, covers a large
variety of phenomena which also differ from one another
in relation to their different degree of abstractness, i.e., the
creativity of the hunting technique of the bird is much less
abstract than that displayed by Beethoven in the writing of
the fifth symphony.
It is not our intention in this paper even to attempt to give
a definition of creativity. What we want to do here is simply
to focus on the concept of analogy — the relation in whichA
1(Grace, Saunders, and Gero 2008), Section2, page2
is toB is the same as the relation in which α is to β — which
is at the heart of much of what we can correctly describe as
creative activity.
A traditional model of analogical thinking is provided by






where A and B are entities homogeneous to each other —
like α and β are homogeneous to each other — but A and B
are non-homogeneous to α and β. Analogical thinking al-
lows the emergence/recognition of a pattern in a certain en-
vironment E which is similar/the same as that which has al-
ready emerged/been recognized in another environment E′.
Much of the work to be done in what follows will consist
in rendering mathematically rigorous what we have called
‘pattern’, ‘environmentE’, ‘analogy as similarity of patterns
given in different environments’, ‘identity of patterns given
in different environments’, etc. etc.
Let us say that patterns are here understood as relational
entities (structures) defined on a given domain.2 And since a
necessary condition for the emergence/recognition of a pat-
tern is the presence of a system of representation, we are
going to identify the environment E with such a system,
and choose as a model of such a system of representation
Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual spaces. Moreover, two patterns pi1
and pi2 given in two different conceptual spaces V1 and V2
are said to be ‘analogous to one another’ if there is an ho-
momorphism between pi1 and pi2, whereas they are said to be
‘exemplifying the same pattern’ if there is an isomorphism
between pi1 and pi2.
A cognitive architecture based on Conceptual
Spaces
The introduction of a cognitive architecture for an artificial
agent implies the definition of a conceptual representation
model.
Conceptual spaces (CS), employed extensively in the last
few years (Chella, Frixione, and Gaglio 1997) (De Paola et
al. 2009) (Jung, Menon, and Arkin 2011), were originally
introduced by Ga¨rdenfors as a bridge between symbolic and
connectionist models of information representation. This
was part of an attempt to describe what he calls the ‘geome-
try of thought’.
In (Ga¨rdenfors 2000) and (Ga¨rdenfors 2004) we find a
description of a cognitive architecture for modelling repre-
sentations. This is a cognitive architecture in which an in-
termediate level, called ‘geometric conceptual space’, is in-
troduced between a linguistic-symbolic level and an associ-
ationist sub-symbolic level of information representation.
The cognitive architecture (see figure 1), is composed
by three levels of representation: a subconceptual level,
in which data coming from the environment are processed
by means of a neural networks based system, a conceptual
level, where data are represented and conceptualized inde-
pendently of language; and, finally, a symbolic level which
2For the special case represented by mathematical patterns see
(Oliveri 1997), (Oliveri 2007), ch. 5, and (Oliveri 2012).
makes it possible to manage the information produced at the
conceptual level at a higher level through symbolic compu-
tations. The conceptual space acts as a workspace in which
low-level and high-level processes access and exchange in-
formation respectively from bottom to top and from top to
bottom. The description of the symbolic and subconceptual
levels goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 1: A sketch of the cognitive architecture
According to the linguistic/symbolic level:
“Cognition is seen as essentially being computation, in-
volving symbol manipulation (Ga¨rdenfors 2000)”.
whereas, for the associationist sub-symbolic level:
“Associations among different kinds of information el-
ements carry the main burden of representation. Con-
nectionism is a special case of associationism that
models associations using artificial neuron networks
(Ga¨rdenfors 2000), where the behaviour of the network
as a whole is determined by the initial state of activa-
tion and the connections between the units (Ga¨rdenfors
2000)”.
Although the symbolic approach allows very rich and ex-
pressive representations, it appears to have some intrinsic
limitations such as the so-called “symbol grounding prob-
lem”, 3 and the well known A.I. “frame problem”.4 On the
3How to specify the meaning of symbols without an infinite
regress deriving from the impossibility for formal systems to cap-
ture their semantics. See (Harnad 1990).
4Having to give a complete description of even a simple robot’s
other hand, the associationist approach suffers from its low-
level nature, which makes it unsuited for complex tasks, and
representations.
Ga¨rdenfors’ proposal of a third way of representing infor-
mation exploits geometrical structures rather than symbols
or connections between neurons. This geometrical represen-
tation is based on a number of what Ga¨rdenfors calls ‘qual-
ity dimensions’ whose main function is to represent different
qualities of objects such as brightness, temperature, height,
width, depth.
Moreover, for Ga¨rdenfors, judgments of similarity play a
crucial role in cognitive processes. And, according to him,
it is possible to associate the concept of distance to many
kinds of quality dimensions. This idea naturally leads to
the conjecture that the smaller is the distance between the
representations of two given objects the more similar to each
other the objects represented are.
According to Ga¨rdenfors, objects can be represented as
points in a conceptual space, knoxels (Gaglio et al. 1988)
5, and concepts as regions within a conceptual space. These
regions may have various shapes, although to some concepts
— those which refer to natural kinds or natural properties —
correspond regions which are characterized by convexity.6
For Ga¨rdenfors, this latter type of region is strictly related
to the notion of prototype, i.e., to those entities that may be
regarded as the archetypal representatives of a given cate-
gory of objects (the centroids of the convex regions).
One of the most serious problems connected with
Ga¨rdenfors’ conceptual spaces is that these have, for him,
a phenomenological connotation. In other words, if, for ex-
ample, we take, the conceptual space of colours this, accord-
ing to Ga¨rdenfors, must be able to represent the geometry of
colour concepts in relation to how colours are given to us.
However, we have chosen a non phenomenological ap-
proach to conceptual spaces in which we substitute the ex-
pression ‘measurement’ for the expression ‘perception’, and
consider a cognitive agent which interacts with the environ-
ment by means of the measurements taken by its sensors
rather than a human being.
Of course, we are aware of the controversial nature of our
non phenomenological approach to conceptual spaces. But,
since our main task in this paper is characterizing a ratio-
nal agent with the view of providing a model for artificial
agents, it follows that our non-phenomenological approach
to conceptual spaces is justified independently of our opin-
ions on perceptions and their possible representations within
conceptual spaces
Although the cognitive agent we have in mind is not a
human being, the idea of simulating perception by means of
measurement is not so far removed from biology. To see this,
world using axioms and rules to describe the result of different
actions and their consequences leads to the “combinatorial explo-
sion” of the number of necessary axioms.
5The term ‘knoxel’ originates from (Gaglio et al. 1988) by
the analogy with “pixel”. A knoxel k is a point in Conceptual
Space and it represents the epistemologically primitive element at
the considered level of analysis.
6A set S is convex if and only if whenever a, b ∈ S and c is
between a and b then c ∈ S.
consider that human beings, and other animals, to survive
need to have a fairly good ability to estimate distance. The
frog unable to determine whether a fly is ‘within reach’ or
not is, probably, not going to live a long and happy life.
Our CA is provided with sensors which are capable,
within a certain interval of intensities, of registering differ-
ent intensities of stimulation. For example, let us assume
that CA has a visual perception of a green object h. If CA
makes of the measure of the colour of h its present stereotype
of green then it can, by means of a comparison of different
measurements, introduce an ordering of gradations of green
with respect to the stereotype; and, of course, it can also dis-
tinguish the colour of the stereotype from the colour of other
red, blue, yellow, etc. objects. In other words, in this way
CA is able to introduce a ‘green dimension’ into its colour
space, a dimension within which the measure of the colour
of the stereotype can be taken to perform the role of 0.
The formal model of a conceptual space that at this point
immediately springs to mind is that of a metric space, i.e.,
it is that of a set X endowed with a metric. However, since
the metric space X which is the candidate for being a model
of a conceptual space has dimensions, dimensions the ele-
ments of which are associated with coordinates which are
the outcomes of (possible) measurements made by CA, per-
haps a better model of a conceptual space might be an n-
dimensional vector space V over a fieldK like, for example,
Rn (with the usual inner product and norm) on R.
Although this suggestion is interesting, we cannot help
noticing that an important disanalogy between an n-
dimensional vector space V over a field K, and the ‘bi-
ological conceptual space’ that V is supposed to model is
that human, animal, and artificial sensors are strongly non-
linear. In spite of its cogency, at this stage we are not going
to dwell on this difficulty, because: (1) we intend to examine
the ‘ideal’ case first; and because (2) we hypothesize that it is
always possible to map a perceptual space into a conceptual
space where linearity is preserved either by performing, for
example, a small-signal approach, or by means of a projec-
tion onto a linear space, as it is performed in kernel systems
(Scholkopf and Smola 2001).
The Music and Visual Conceptual Spaces
Let us consider a CA which can perceive both musical tones
and visual scenes. The CA is able to build two types of
conceptual spaces in order to represent its perceptions. As
reported in (Augello et al. 2013a) (Augello et al. 2013b),
the agent’s conceptual spaces are generated by measure-
ment processes; in this manner each knoxel is, directly or
indirectly, related to measurements obtained from different
sensors. Each knoxel is, therefore, represented as a vector
k = (x1, x2, ..., xn) where xi belongs to the Xi quality di-
mension of our n-dimensional vector space. The Concep-
tual Spaces can also be manipulated according to changes
of the focus of attention of the agent (Augello et al. 2013a)
(Augello et al. 2013b), however the description of this pro-
cess goes beyond the scope of this paper and will not be
described here.
Visual conceptual space
According to Biederman’s geons theory (see (Biederman
1987)), the visual perception of an object is processed by
our brain as a proper composition of simple solids of dif-
ferent shapes (the geons). Following Biederman main ideas,
we exploit a conceptual space for the description of visual
scenarios (see fig. 2) where objects are represented as com-
positions of super-quadrics, and super-quadrics are vectors
in this conceptual space.
Figure 2: Visual perception and corresponding CS represen-
tation
For those who are not familiar with the concept of super-
quadric, let us say that super-quadrics are geometric shapes
derived from the quadrics parametric equation with the
trigonometric functions raised to two real exponents. The
inside/outside function of the superquadric in implicit form
is:




















where the parameters ax, ay, az are the lengths of the super-
quadric axes, the exponents ε1, ε2, called ‘form factors’, are
responsible for the shapes form: values approaching 1 ren-
der the shape rounded.
To see this, let us suppose that the vision system can
be approximated and modeled as a set of receptors, and
that these receptors give as output, corresponding to the
external perceived stimulation, the set of super-quadrics
parameters associated to the perceived object. This leads
to a superquadric conceptual representation of a 3D world.
The situation is illustrated in Fig 2 where an object posi-
tioned in the 3D space, let us say an apple, is approximately
perceived as a sphere and is consequently mapped as a
knoxel in the related conceptual space.
In particular a knoxel in the Visual Conceptual space can
be described by the vector:
−→
k = (ax, ay, az, ε1, ε2, px, py, pz, ϕ, θ, ψ)
T
In this perspective, knoxels correspond to simple geomet-
ric building blocks, while complex objects or situations are
represented as suitable sets of knoxels (see figure 3).
Figure 3: A representation of a hammer in the visual con-
ceptual space as a composition of two super-quadrics
Music Conceptual Space
In (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), Gardenfors discusses a program for
musical spaces analysis directly inspired to the framework
of vision proposed by Marr (Marr 1982). This discussion
has been further analysed by Chella in (Chella 2013), where
a music conceptual space has been proposed and placed into
the layers of the cognitive architecture described in the pre-
vious sections.
As reported in (Shepard 1982), it has been highlighted
that for the music of all human cultures, the relation between
pitch and time appears to be crucial for the recognition of a
familiar piece of music. In consideration of this, the repre-
sentation of pitch becomes prominent for the representation
of tones.
In the music CS the quality dimensions represent informa-
tion about the partials composing musical tones. This choice
is inspired by empirical results about the perception of tones
to be found in (Oxenham 2013).
We model the functions of the ear as a finite set of fil-
ters, each one centred on the i-th frequency (we suppose
for example to have N filters ranging from 20Hz to 20KHz
at proper intervals. In this manner, a perceived sound will
be decomposed into its partials and mapped as a vector
V = (c1, c2, · · · , cn) whose components correspond to the
coefficients of the n frequencies that compose the sound
(ω1, ω2, · · ·ωn), as illustrated in Fig 4. The supposition
is that here we use the discrete Fourier Series Transform,
which is commonly used in signal processing, considering




V is, therefore, a knoxel of the music concep-
tual space. The partials of a tone are related both to the pitch
and the timbre of the perceived note. Roughly, the funda-
mental frequency is related to the pitch, while the amplitudes
of the remaining partials are also related to the timbre of the
note. A similar choice is to be found in Tanguiane (Tan-
guiane 1993).
A knoxel in the music CS will change its position when
the perceived tone changes its pitch or its loudness or tim-
Figure 4: Music perception and corresponding CS represen-
tation
bre. In fig. 5 it is shown how the symbolic level given by
the pentagram representation of a chord is mapped into a
conceptual space representation.
Figure 5: A representation of two chords in the music con-
ceptual space.
From Visual Patterns to Music Patterns
A cognitive agent is able to represent its different percep-
tions in proper conceptual spaces; as soon as the agent per-
ceives visual scenes or music, a given geometric structure
will emerge. This structure will be made of vectors and re-
gions, conceptual representations of perceived objects.
Music and visual conceptual spaces are two examples
of conceptual representations that can be thought as a ba-
sis for computational simulation of an analogical thinking
that provides the agent with some sort of creative capabil-
ity. Knowledge and experiences made in a very specific do-
main of perception can be exploited by the agent in order to
better understand or to express in different ways the experi-
ences and the perceptions that belong to other domains. This
process resembles the synaesthesia 7 affecting some people,
which allows to perform analogies between elements and ex-
periences belonging to different sensory areas. Analogical
thinking reveals similarities between patterns belonging to
different domains.
For what concerns the music and vision domains, several
analogies have been discussed in the literature. As an exam-
ple, Tanguiane (Tanguiane 1993) compares visual and music
perceptions, considering three different levels and both static
and dynamic point of views. In particular, from a static point
of view, a first visual level, that is the pixel perception level,
can correspond the perception of partials in music. At the
second level, the perception of simple patterns in vision cor-
responds to the perception of single notes. Finally at the
third level, the perception of structured patterns (as patterns
of patterns), corresponds to the perception of chords.
Concerning dynamic perception, the first level is the same
as in the case of static perception, while at the second level
the perception of visual objects corresponds to the percep-
tion of musical notes, and at the third final level the percep-
tion of visual trajectories corresponds to the perception of
music melodies.
Ga¨rderfors (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), in his paper on “Seman-
tics, Conceptual Spaces and Music” discusses a program for
musical spaces analysis directly inspired to the framework of
vision proposed by Marr (Marr 1982), where the first level
is related to pitch identification; the second level is related
to the identification of musical intervals and the third level
to tonality, where scales are identified and the concepts of
chromaticity and modulation arise. The fourth level of anal-
ysis is that at which the interplay of pitch and time is repre-
sented.
In what follows we are going to illustrate a framework for
possible relationships between visual and musical domains.
The mapping is one among many possible, and it has been
chosen in order to make clear and easily understandable the
whole process. As we have already said, it is possible to
represent complex objects in a conceptual space as a set of
knoxels. In particular, in the visual conceptual space, a com-
plex object can be described as the set of knoxels represent-
ing the simple shapes of which it is composed, whereas in
the music conceptual space we have seen how to represent
chords as the set of knoxels representing the different tones
played together.
In the two spaces will emerge recurrent patterns, given
respectively by proper configurations of shapes and tones
which occur more frequently. A fundamental analogy be-
tween the two domains can be highlighted, concerning the
importance of the mutual relationships between the parts
composing a complex object. In fact, in the case of per-
ception of complex objects in vision, their mutual positions
and shapes are important in order to describe the perceived
object: e.g., in the case of an hammer, the mutual positions
and the mutual shapes of the handle and the head are obvi-
7a condition in which the stimulation of one sense causes the
automatic experience of another sense
ously important to classify the complex object as an ham-
mer. A the same time, the mutual relationships between the
pitches (and the timbres) of the perceived tones are impor-
tant in order to describe the perceived chord (to distinguish
for example, a major from a minor chord of the same note).
Therefore, spatial relationships in static scenes analysis are
in some sense analogous to sounds relationships in music
conceptual space.
Although in this work we are overlooking the dynamic
aspect of perception in the two domains of analysis, we
can also mention some possible analogies, for example, we
could correlate the trajectory of a moving object with a suc-
cession of different notes within a melody.
As certain movements are harmonious or not, so in music
the succession of certain tones creates pleasant feelings or
not.
Visual representation of musical objects: a
case study
In what follows, we describe a procedure capable of simu-
lating some aspects of analogical thinking. In particular, we
consider an agent able to: (1) represent tones and visual ob-
jects within two different conceptual spaces; and (2) build
analogies between auditory perceptions and visual percep-
tions.
At the heart of this procedure there is the ability on the
part of the CA of individuating the appropriate homomor-
phism f : Rn → Rm which maps a knoxel belonging to a
n-dimensional conceptual space Rn — the acoustic domain
— on to another knoxel in a different m-dimensional con-
ceptual space Rm — the visual domain.
For the sake of clarity we simplify the previously illus-
trated model of both music and visual conceptual represen-
tation of the agent. In particular:
• for what concerns the visual perceptions, we consider
only a visual coding of spheres: this leads to the as-
sumption that every observed object will be perceived as
a sphere or as a composition of spheres by the agent;
• for what concerns the auditory perceptions, we consider
only a limited set of discrete frequencies which the agent
perceives. All information about pitch, loudness and tim-
bre is implicitly represented in the auditory conceptual
space by the Fourier Analysis parameters.
Figure 6 illustrates the mapping process leading from
sensing and representation in the music conceptual spaces
to a pictorial representation of the heard tone. The mapping
is realized through an analogy transformation which let arise
a visual knoxel in he visual conceptual space. The analogy
process of the agent can be outlined in the following steps:
• the agent perceives a sound (A)
• the sound is sensed and decomposed through Fourier
Transform Analysis (A)
• the measurements on the partials lead to a conceptual
representation of the perceived sound as a knoxel in the
acoustic space (A)
Figure 6: Mapping process leading from sensing and representation in the music conceptual spaces to a pictorial representation
of the heard tone
• the knoxel kA in the acoustic space is transformed into a
knoxel kV in the visual conceptual space (B)
• the mapping lets arise a conceptual representation of an
object that is not actually perceived. It is only “imagined”
by analogy. (C)
• the “birth” of this new item in the visual conceptual space,
is directly related to the “birth” of an image, which, most
importantly, is simply imagined and not perceived (D)
Given two conceptual spaces Rn and Rm, the mapping
can be any multidimensional function that realizes the ap-
propriate transformation f : Rn → Rm. The function f
can be learned in a supervised or unsupervised way through
machine learning algorithms.
At present, we superimpose the structure f . In order to
make a choice for f we take some inspirations from Shepard
in (Shepard 1982).
Many geometrical mappings have been proposed for
pitch: the simplest one is that one which use of a monodi-
mensional logarithmic scale where each pure tone is related
to the logarithm of its frequency.
However, according to the two component theory (Re´ve´sz
1954) (Shepard 1982), the best manner to pictorially repre-
sent pitches is a helix or 3D-spiral instead of a straight line.
A mapping based on this theory is illustrated in fig. 7, where
simple sounds are drawn on the helix, as spheres of different
sizes, according to their associated loudness.
That mapping allows to complete one turn per octave and
reaches the necessary geometric proximity between points
which are an octave distant from each other.
The strong point of the uniform helix representation is that
the distance corresponding to any particular musical interval
is invariant throughout the representation. Each tone can
be mapped onto a spiral laying on a cylinder where points
vertically aligned correspond to the same tone with different
octave. This projective property holds regardless of the slope
of the helix (Shepard 1982).
In superimposing f we suppose that when the agent per-
ceives a sound which is louder than another one, this evokes
in his mind the view of something that is more cumbersome
than another one. We assume that this perceived object has
no preferred direction or shape, therefore the easiest way to
represent it is a sphere, whose radius can be associated to
the loudness of the perceived sound.
The other parameter is the pitch. As soon as the agent per-
ceives different pitches, he tries to visualize them, imagine
them, locate them according to the helix whose equations
are:
x = rcos(2piω) (1)
y = rsin(2piω) (2)
z = cω (3)
If we consider a simple tone of given frequency ω , the
pitch will be represented by a point p(x, y, z) in the spiral,
while its loudness L will be represented by a sphere having
centre in p(x, y, z) and a radius whose length r is related to
the perceived loudness.
The sphere corresponds to a knoxel in the Visual-
conceptual-space, while the perceived tone corresponds to
a knoxel in the Music-conceptual-space.
The agent therefore will visually imagine the perceived
sound as a sphere whose radius is proportional to the per-
ceived loudness, while its position corresponds to a point
laying on the helical line representing all the tones that can
be perceived by the agent, and a chord will be imagined as a
set of spheres in this 3D space.
Conclusions
We have illustrated a methodology for the computational
emulation of analogy, which is an important part of the
imaginative process characterizing the creative capabilities
of human beings.
The approach is based on a mapping between geometric
conceptual representations which are related to the percep-
tive capabilities of an agent.
Even though this mapping can be built up in several differ-
ent ways, we presented a proof-of-concept example of some
analogies between music and visual perceptions. This al-
lows the agent to associate imagined, unseen images to per-
ceived sounds. It is worthwhile to point out that, in similar
Figure 7: Visual representation of music chords deriving from a “two-component theory” based mapping
way, it is possible to imagine sounds to be associated to vi-
sual scenes, and the same can be done with different kinds
of perceptions.
We claim that this approach could be a step towards the
computation of many forms of the creative process. In future
works different types of mapping will be investigated and
properly evaluated.
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